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Recent Cases

the product from afar, but whether the
consumer would be confused in purchasing the product.
The Seventh Circuit also noted that
Stanard's company sold its products
through mail order and required a customer to make a check payable to
"JUST DID IT" Enterprises. Accordingly, the court found that for confusion to occur, a customer must not
only see "MIKE" as similar to "NIKE,"
but must continue to confuse the two
while making a check payable to
"JUST DID IT" Enterprises.
Stanard's Intent in Producing
"MIKE" Products
The Seventh Circuit determined
that a jury could reasonably find that
Stanard intended to amuse consumers, not confuse them, by creating a
parody of the "NIKE" trademark. The
court maintained that parodies do not
happen incidentally. Rather, a parody
results from the actual knowledge of
the trademark which the presenter,
observer, and consumer possess.
Stanard repeatedly admitted his awareness of Nike' s trademarks and asserted
that he only intended to mock Nike's
image.
Additionally, the court concluded
that the district court had erroneously
based its decision on Stanard's statement that the whole point of the parody
was to confuse observers viewing the
shirts at first glance from across the
room. The Seventh Circuit determined
that the ultimate issue was whether a
customer was confused when deciding to purchase an item, not whether a
member of the general public was
confused when viewing Stanard's
product.
Additional Factors Considered
The Seventh Circuit examined additional factors to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion. In
reviewing the marketing channels employed by "JUST DID IT" Enterprises,
the Seventh Circuit recognized that
Stanard specifically targeted an audience who would appreciate the distinction between "MIKE" and
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"NIKE." Accordingly, a jury could
conclude that Stanard's target market
would intentionally purchase a product with the "MIKE" parody, but not
the "NIKE" symbol. The court reasoned that consumers' conscious decisions would tend to show that they
were not confused as to whether Nike
endorsed Stanard's products.
The Seventh Circuit also disagreed
with the district court's conclusion
that the price of Stanard's products
suggested that consumers would not
exercise a high degree of care in making their purchases. Nike failed to
offer evidence as to the degree of care
consumers would exercise in purchasing T-shirts and sweatshirts. The court
concluded that absent such evidence,
a jury could find that customers used
care when purchasing T-shirts and
sweatshirts with different labels.
Finally, the court found that because Nike failed to provide any evidence of actual consumer confusion, a
reasonable jury could determine that
Stanard's parody was not likely to
confuse consumers. Consequently,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Nike and remanded the case
for further proceedings. -.
Brian K. Wydajewski

Foreign-Language
Warnings Not Required
for Nonprescription
Drugs
In Ramirez v. Plough, 863 P.2d
167 (Cal. 1993), the Supreme Court of
California held that manufacturers of
nonprescription drugs do not have a
legal duty to include foreign-language
warnings with their packaging materials.
Child Develops Reye's Syndrome
The minor plaintiff, Jorge Ramirez,
brought suit through his mother against
Plough, Inc., claiming that he developed Reye's syndrome by taking St.
Joseph Aspirin for Children (SJAC),
a nonprescription drug manufactured
by Plough. In March 1986, when
Ramirez was less than four months
old, his mother gave him SJAC to
relieve cold symptoms. Ramirez's
mother did not seek the advice of a
doctor before using SJAC, although
the label stated that for children under
two, the dosage was "as directed by
doctor." She gave Ramirez three SJAC
tablets over a two-day period. When
she took Ramirez to the hospital on
March 15, the doctor recommended
that she use nonprescription drugs that
did not contain aspirin. Ramirez's
mother, however, continued to administer SJAC. Ramirez then developed
Reye's syndrome, resulting in severe
neurological damage, including cortical blindness, spastic quadriplegia, and
mental retardation.
Reye's syndrome is a disease that
is fatal in 20 to 30 percent of cases,
with many instances of permanent
brain damage. The cause of Reye's
syndrome is still unknown, but by the
early 1980s, research demonstrated a
link between the use of aspirin during
a viral illness and the development of
Reye's syndrome. These results led
the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to require a warning label on
aspirin products to inform parents
about Reye's syndrome. The FDA
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regulation took effect on March 7,
1986.
Even before the FDA required mandatory warning labels, packages of
SJAC contained warnings about
Reye's syndrome. These warnings
were only written in English. In March
1986, Ramirez's mother purchased a
SJAC package containing such a warning. Although Ramirez's mother was
unable to read the warnings because
they were in English, she did not ask
other members of her household to
translate the warnings for her.
Plaintiff's mother had not been exposed to any advertising for SJAC in
either English or Spanish.
Ramirez, through his mother, sued
Plough in August 1989, claiming
fraud, negligence, and product liability, all based on Plough's alleged failure to warn about Reye's syndrome.
Although Plough admitted that a
manufacturer of nonprescription drugs
has a duty to warn about the dangers
of its products, Plough denied that it
had any legal duty to provide the warning in Spanish. Ramirez presented
evidence that Plough knew that Hispanics, many of whom did not read or
speak English, constituted an important segment of the market for SJAC
and argued that Plough had acted on
this knowledge by advertising in Spanish. Nevertheless, the superior court
granted Plough's motion for summary
judgment, and Ramirez appealed. The
court of appeals reversed, stating that
although the issue of duty is a question of law, the adequacy of the warning is a question of fact, which entitled Ramirez to present his case to
the jury. The Supreme Court of California granted review.
Manufacturersof Nonprescription
Drugs Have No Legal Duty to
Include Foreign-Language
Warnings
In reversing the appellate court's
decision and affirming summaryjudgment for Plough, the Supreme Court
of California held that manufacturers
of nonprescription drugs have no legal duty to include foreign-language
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warnings. The court stated that it
could properly resolve issues relating
to the scope of an established duty
because the applicable standard of care
is a question of law for the court.
The supreme court first considered
what standard of care applied to
Plough's duty to warn its customers
about the dangers of Reye' s syndrome.
The court stated that the duty of care
of a reasonably prudent person under
like circumstances is normally the
proper standard. In certain situations,
however, the conduct of a reasonable
person may be determined by referring to judicial decision, statute, or
ordinance. Because the court ultimately determines the standard of care
in a civil case, the standard prescribed
by a statute becomes the standard in a
civil suit only if the court adopts it. In
this case, Plough argued that the court
should apply the statutory standard to
determine whether Plough's conduct
was reasonable.
Plough asserted that by complying
with statutory standards, its conduct
was reasonable and therefore did not
breach any duty to Ramirez. The
court acknowledged that statutory
compliance might be a valid defense
in this case, but noted that if Ramirez
could show a reasonably prudent product seller would have undertaken
safety measures beyond the statutory
minimum, Plough could be found liable. Plough argued that the standard
of care was best determined by the
vast number of statutes and regulations which had controlled all areas of
its marketing. Plough asserted that
under statutory guidelines, it had complied fully with the law. In response,
the court reviewed the pertinent statutes and regulations.
The court first examined the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
which is a federal regulation stating
that a drug is deemed misbranded if 1)
its labeling is false or misleading; 2)
its required labeling information is
not conspicuously placed; and 3) its
labeling is not easily read or understood by the average consumer. The
FDA further requires that drug labels

state directions for use, list of ingredients, the identity, net quantity of contents, explanation of tamper-resistant
packaging, and approved uses. Finally, a nonprescription drug must also
give warnings about dangers, side effects, and adverse reactions in terms
easily read and understood by the average consumer, including persons of
low comprehension.
Although the FDA encourages foreign-language labeling, the FDA does
not require such labeling, except for
nonprescription drugs distributed only
in Puerto Rico and in an area where
the primary language is not English.
The FDA requires, however, that if
the labeling contains any representation in a foreign language, then other
required information must also be conspicuously stated in that foreign language.
Turning to the statutory standards
prescribed by California law, the court
found that California law follows the
federal labeling requirements, and like
the FDA, does not require foreignlanguage labeling. In other areas,
however, the California Legislature
has dealt with foreign-language requirements by enacting laws to make
sure that its residents are not disadvantaged by the their lack of proficiency in English. In defining the
situations in which a foreign language
must be used, the court found that the
legislature had clearly defined where
foreign language information was required, and that labeling nonprescription drugs in a foreign language was
not among those specified areas.
Given the foreign language requirements in other areas, the court reasoned that had the legislature wanted
to require foreign language warnings,
it would have done so. Therefore, the
court concluded that the legislature,
as well as the FDA, had deliberately
chosen not to require manufacturers
to include foreign-language warnings
on nonprescription drug labels.
The court then analyzed alternative standards of care that the court
might apply if it rejected the FDA
regulations and California law as the
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governing standards. The court suggested two alternative standards of
care: 1) a case-by-case basis where
juries would apply the reasonable person standard; or 2) a judicially created standard of care. The court rejected the first alternative, explaining
that this open-ended rule would compel manufacturers to package all their
nonprescription drugs with warnings
in multiple foreign languages which
would add to the costs and environmental burdens of the packaging. The
court also declined to declare a particularized standard of care since the
judiciary lacks the procedures and the
resources to make relevant inquiries.
Thus, the court concluded that the
administrative and statutory standards
provided the best standard of care.
Although it did not foreclose the
possibility of tort liability premised
upon the content of foreign-language
advertising, the court held that manufacturers do not have a duty to warn
that is broader in scope and more onerous than that currently imposed by
applicable statutes and regulations
because the associated problems and
costs would be too great. The court
adopted the FDA's position that "it is
in the best interest of the consumer,
industry, and the marketplace to have
uniformity in presentation and clarity
of message" in the warnings provided
with nonprescription drugs. The court
reasoned that to preserve this uniformity and clarity, to avoid the problems and costs of foreign-language
requirements, and to defer to the legislature, it adopted the legislative standard of care that required nonprescription drug warnings only in English.
Thus, the court held as a matter of law
that Plough was not liable for failing
to warn Ramirez in Spanish about the
dangers of Reye's syndrome.
The court also denied recovery on
the plaintiff's alternative theories.
Ramirez also argued that the labeling
was defective because it should have
warned against the use of SJAC for
children with colds. The court stated
that because the plaintiff's mother
conceded that she had not read the
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label, plaintiff's injury could not have
been caused by the labeling. In his
other theory, Ramirez also asserted
that Plough should not have distributed SJAC at all since the dangers of
Reye's syndrome outweighed any benefits of SJAC. The court, however,
rejected this theory, stating that Plough
was not liable for keeping its product
in the market when plaintiff's mother
bought it. At that time, the FDA had
not determined whether Reye's syndrome was caused by aspirin, and
therefore, the FDA had concluded that
product warnings were sufficient.
Concurrence Addresses Potential
Liability of Foreign-Language
Advertising
Justice Mosk wrote separately to
address the issue posed but not answered by the majority: the potential
liability arising from foreign-language
advertising based on tort theories of
recovery. The concurrence agreed,
however, that if a nonprescription drug
manufacturer gave reasonable notice
of possible side effects in a foreign
language to a consumer whose purchase was induced in that language,
the manufacturer would meet the standard of reasonable conduct. .Kathie Yoo

Officers and Directors of
Failed Federally
Chartered

Financial Institutions
Will Be Held to a Gross
Negligence Standard of
Liability
In Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir.
1993), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that Section 1821(k) of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
preempts federal common law and
establishes a gross negligence standard of liability for officers and directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions. However, the
court purposefully chose not to reach
the issue of whether Section 1821 (k)'s
gross negligence standard preempts
state law, cautioning that federalism
concerns require greater evidence of
congressional intent to preempt state
law than federal common law.
District Court Dismisses All RTC
Claims
In 1990, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) placed the Concordia
Federal Bank for Savings (Concordia),
a federally chartered and insured thrift,
into receivership. On February 14,
1991, the RTC brought suit against
Concordia's former directors and officers, seeking to recover losses for
alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, and
breach of contract. The RTC maintained that the defendants' conduct
caused Concordia to incur substantial
losses, resulting in the thrift's failure.
The defendants, under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), filed motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dismissed the negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of contract claims, holding that
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